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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
CONDUCT OF COUNSEL
First of all an attorney should know and abide by the ethi-
cal rules of his profession. It is not only embarrassing to a
presiding judge but also to fellow members of the Bar to
see an attorney fail to live up to the Bar's high standards.
And it is always well for one not to place oneself in the posi-
tion of having to be called down in open court and above all
not have oneself recorded as ethicalling lacking in a Supreme
Court's decision. In this connection see Hubbard v. Rowe,
ante, at pages 27-28. Know the canons of Professional Ethics.
At this point particular attention should be paid to Circuit
Court Rules (which are also applicable to County Courts)
9, 11, 14, 31 and Supreme Court Rules 13, 14 and 15. Especial
attention should be given Circuit Rule 77 which provides:
No attorney shall, in argument of any cause before a
jury, address or refer to by name any member of the
jury he is addressing, or otherwise personally appeal to
any member thereof.
An infraction of that rule can be very embarrassing to a
juror. Although Rule 9, which is also applicable to County
Courts, doesn't permit an attorney to become a surety as to
any recognizance in the Court of General Sessions or upon
any undertaking in the Court of Common Pleas, or County
Court, violation of which Rule is punishable as for a con-
tempt of court, nevertheless Section 49-10 allows any attorney
to act as a notary.
As County Judge, an attorney took the stand in so many
cases on factual issues that it became embarrassing to the at-
torneys on the other side, especially when the fact had to be
argued as to who was telling the truth. The writer called
the attorney's attention to the authorities on the subject, and
he thereafter took a young attorney into his office who there-
after handled such facts, took the witness stand but did not
handle the trial case at all. The reaction from the local bar
was very satisfactory.
Particular instances of conduct by counsel: In some juris-
dictions it is improper in a suit for damages by one who is
a husband and father for plaintiff's attorney to bring before
the jury the fact that plaintiff has a wife and a certain num-
ber of children. In those jurisdictions it is considered so im-
proper that even an instruction to the jury that they must
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pay no attention to the fact is not considered sufficient to
undo the attorney's error. However, in South Carolina such
facts can be brought into evidence and even used as basis
of argument relative to the amount of actual damages which
can be awarded, since in this state one is under a legal duty
to support his wife and children. As said in Youngblood v.
Railroad Co. (1900), 60 S. C. 9, 38 S. E. 232, 85 Am. St. Rep.
824, at page 14:
* * * the testimony was admissible, not for the purpose of
showing that the plaintiff was entitled to recover dam-
ages sustained by the members of his family, by reason
of his injury, but as tending to show that one of the
direct and proximate results flowing from the defendant's
alleged negligence was to deprive him of the capacity to
meet the obligation imposed upon him by law of sup-
porting his family. Johns v. R. R. Co., 39 S. C., 162;
Mathis v. Ry. Co., 53 S. C., 258. If this was a direct and
proximate result of the injury, we see no reason why it
should not have been considered by the jury in estimating
the damages which he sustained. Pickens v. Railway Co.,
54 S. C., 498. A person is certainly damaged when he is
deprived of the ability to meet a legal obligation. ....
Other Rules of Court as bearing on conduct: At this point
it may be well to call attention to other Rules of trial courts
which every trial lawyer should thoroughly know and
abide by.
Conduct in the Court Room: One should not smoke in a
court room. Some South Carolina judges have rules to that
effect in their respective circuits. Whether one can smoke
in a judge's office, when a hearing is being had there, as in a
magistrate's court, or before a quasi-judicial body, should al-
ways be ascertained before one begins to indulge. It is better
to adopt that method than place the presiding officer in the
embarrassing position of having to ask one to desist in the
event he is against smoking in such environment.
Courtesy, graciousness and keeping one's equilibrium in
the court room and also when entering and leaving always
characterizes the outstanding practitioner. Anything less than
that tends to lower one in the esteem of those who must work
with him in that legal environment. It belittles a trial lawyer
at a time when he should not only have in mind the winning
of his client's case, but also winning the respect of Bench
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and Bar, and ever mindful of prospective clients from among
those present as well as through them to those who are absent.
As in any other business it's the day by day impact that
counts and one can't be too careful of each day's endeavor.
Rules of the Probate Court: These Rules went into opera-
tion in 1879. Although Section 15-447 gives the Supreme
Court power to make changes in such rules, there is nothing
to indicate anything has been done in that regard. Also,
there is only one annotation and that is to Rule 1 as to what
records the Probate Judge has to keep. This is a clear indi-
cation that none of the other rules have ever been to the
Supreme Court and that they are seldom, if ever, used where
the matter is covered by an applicable rule of the Circuit
Court which is provided for in Probate Court Rule 15.
However, Rule 5, as to whose duty it is to "issue his sum-
mons" when a petition or complaint has been filed has no
counterpart in any Circuit Court Rule and that duty is not
touched upon in Section 15-448 of the 1952 Code; so Rule 5
is the only law on that phase. Therefore, like in the magis-
trate court, the Probate Judge "shall" issue, which usually
means "sign", the summons. But immemorial custom in Rich.
land County, and in many of the other counties the writer is
informed, has changed Rule 5 so that the attorney signs the
summons on the right and the Probate Judge only "attests"
it at the lower left. Thus does time gradually change an im-
portant judicial step without the aid of court, or legislative
action.
Rules 6 and 8 as to form, etc., of pleadings and necessary
papers are in part like Circuit Court Rules 12 and 13. How-
ever, the requirements of the latter are much more compre-
hensive and detailed, and it is best that they be substituted
in their entirety as allowed by Probate Court Rule 15.
Rule 7 should be compared with Circuit Court Rule 11, and
Rule 9 with Rule 14, and Rule 11 with Rule 19.
Rules of Circuit and County Courts: Circuit Court Rules
now apply also to County Courts. These rules are just as
important as constitutional provisions or statutes. It is true,
since they are court-made they can be court-waived, but one
better not depend on his negligence or ignorance being so
waived or over-looked by the court, as it is not often done,
and usually only in criminal cases involving human liberty.
[Vol. 11
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State v. O'Shields, 163 S. C. 408, 161 S. E. 692. In civil cases
of much importance the Supreme Court, for instance, will
over-look non-conformity to its rules. Craig v. Pickens County,
189 S. C. 164, 200 S. E. 825. But it must be remembered that
such waiving of a rule is solely in the court's discretion.
Hence, every beginner should read the court rules care-
fully and study the annotations thoroughly before trying a
case. It even pays as the years go by to go over them once
in a while. It is impracticable, if not impossible, to carry all
of any branch of the law in one's head.
Rules 12 and 13 should be carefully analyzed and applied
when preparing any pleadings or necessary papers for court
procedure. It will be noted that non-compliance with Rule 13
involves a severe penalty in that the "Clerk shall not file
the same, nor will the Court hear any motion or application
founded thereon."
Rule 18, first paragraph, can readily show up one's ignor-
ance or negligence in the very first procedural step in a case,
namely in drawing the necessary pleadings. It provides that
every "distinct cause of action, defense, counterclaim or reply
... shall be separately stated and numbered," and a counter-
claim "shall be distinctly entitled and designated as such."
Since each paragraph in every pleading, if more than one,
should be numbered also, it is well to keep in mind that the
best trial lawyers use Roman numerals placed in the center of
the page, for numbering separate causes, defenses, and a coun-
terclaim, as follows:
I.
For a First Cause of Action
II.
For a Second Cause of Action
The same method is followed in designating and numbering
each defense. If a counterclaim is to be also pled, the follow-
ing appears in the center of the page:
Ill.
For a Third Defense and Counterclaim.
The paragraphs of each cause, defense and those of the
counterclaim, are numbered with the ordinary numerals. If,
4
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as in some pleadings, there have to be many paragraphs, the
use of Roman numerals would be unweildy and confusing;
and where there are more than one cause of action or defense,
it is evident that a choice has to be made. To this extent one
better not go by the forms set forth in Earle's Form Book
and in some of the other Form Books.
Under Rule 19 time for answering or demurring will not
be extended without a certificate from the attorney that there
exists a meritorious defense. In other words a court won't
allow its time to be wasted. Just as in applying Section
10-1213, Savage vs. Cannon, 204 S. C. 473, 30 S. E. (2) 70,
held that a default judgment will not be vacated unless the
defendant shows he has a meritorious defense.
Rule 25 must now be integrated with Section 38-65, which
as heretofore noted allows either a blind person or a child
under 10 years of age to draw the name of each juror as he
is presented in a criminal case.
Rule 26 is largely dispensed with in counties, such as Rich-
land, which have consolidated calendars. Section 10-1110
through 10-1121. In all other counties the Rule must be inte-
grated with Sections 10-1101 through 10-1106.
Rule 29 provides that a plaintiff need not be present when
the jury returns to deliver its verdict. However, it is always
best for his attorney to be present so that if anything is wrong
with the form of the verdict, a request can be made of the
judge to have the jury go back and reconsider or correct it;
otherwise, serious injury can be done to a client's rights with
no further chance to have it remedied.
Besides the necessity of filing orders within a reasonable
time, as pointed out in Jordan v. State Highway Department
(1939), 190 S. C. 397, 3 S. E. 2d 201, Circuit Court Rule 68
as to filing of papers must be complied with. The failure to
do so can result in serious loss to both client and attorney, as
indicated by Townsend v. Sparks, 50 S. C. 380, 27 S. E. 801.
Rule 72, requiring a certain notice in a criminal case within
the short time of two days after verdict should be kept in
mind.
Rule 76 as to nonsuit or direction of a verdict for want of
evidence, that is for legal insufficiency of same, is one of the
most important procedural ones, as the numerous annotations
thereunder clearly indicate. Also, the use of this is a condition
[Vol. 11
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precedent to using Rule 79, which latter rule gives a litigant
a chance to have a trial judge correct his error in not directing
a verdict in his favor by rendering for such litigant a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. Its use is also a condition
precedent to moving for a new trial on the ground of legal
insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. So, both
rules, especially 76, should always be kept in the forefront
when trying a case, whether the case be criminal or civil.
It is true that the Supreme Court will sometimes waive a
failure to comply with a court-made rule, but it is usually only
done in criminal cases involving one's liberty, and seldom, if
ever, in a civil case.
Arguments, oral and written: Oral argument is very im-
portant, whether it be to judge, magistrate, or a quasi-judicial
functionary, such as Public Service Commission or a Hearing
Commissioner in a workman's compensation case. There is
always a right involved; your object is to convince the one
who is to pass upon that right your client should win. To do
so, be prepared on both the facts and the law; know what
you are going to say; if so, the tongue won't have to hesitate
while the mind catches up with an idea. In other words, keep
static out of your argument. Uh, ah, um and their meaning-
less sound equivalents indicate (1) unpreparedness or (2)
a habit of speech akin to stuttering. The former is easily
remedied by preparation; the latter by practicing talking
slowly when alone or with someone as an audience who will
aid you. It will take time, but it will be worth it.
When radio has static, one can dial it off. When your voice
has it, the hearer cannot dial you off. He must listen and
he gets so he is listening to you but not hearing what you say.
It is not registering; he becomes mentally too uncomfortable
to follow your argument. You are doing anything but con-
vincing him. Time is wasted. If in doubt, it will be human
for him to decide in favor of your adversary.
The writer speaks from bitter experience. When first ap-
pearing in a literary society debate when starting college at
Sewanee, he was informed by the hearing professor that he
would never be a debater unless he rid himself of the stutter-
ing habit. Following the professor's instructions, such as
are given above, and although it took constant, careful effort
for almost a year, the habit was overcome. The result: the
writer finally won a place on the debating team which was
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the first one to win a Sewanee-Vanderbilt debate. So, no mat-
ter how fixed that habit may be, fight it and win. A suc-
cessful career can depend on such victory.
Before leaving the subject of oral argument, gradually
train yourself to be relaxed; tenseness puts on the brakes.
Here again preparedness is basic. Be concise, to the point,
look whomsoever you are trying to convince straight in the
eye. This means you must know your subject so well that
you won't have to keep your eyes centered on a book or brief
for the purpose of reading matter therein; make that reading
only necessary when the matter must be quoted.
Use gestures - not too often and not flinging your hands
and arms about - but when necessary to give backing to
your utterance by the emphasis of a careful gesture, and thus
the more readily drive home the ,point you are then making.
Don't use "Your Honor" or "May it please the Court" and
synonymous expressions too often. They can become tiresome
to the hearer, and again he is listening, as he must, but not
hearing. Always close your argument with a conclusion which
is a brief, clear summary of the points made, together with
a concise, specific summary of your supporting reasons. Help-
ful here will be the typical conclusions - one good, the other
bad - quoted below with reference to written arguments.
Attorneys are human. Like others, each of them ,become
individualistic - each is going to develop his own personality
- so each" will finally have his own style of argument. But
in developing that style, each must have due regard for certain
fundamentals; hence the procedure just outlined above for
whatever help it may be. See "Curable Faults in Oral Argu-
ment" by Weiner, in Vol. 7, page 573, South Carolina Law
Quarterly.
Some of that procedure can well be applied to written argu-
ments, whether Briefs presented to the trial judge or quasi-
judicial functionary, or those filed in appealed cases for use
by appellate courts.
Here again, a proper conclusion can be of great aid in
clinching an argument; an improper one can be of just as
great aid in unclinching it.
An example of an improper conclusion to a 17 page appel-
late Brief is found in the following:
[Vol, 11
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this defendant respectfully sub-
mits a new trial should be granted.
Names of Attorneys
Attorneys for Appellant
Although Powers v. Rawis (1921), 119 S. C. 134, 112 S. E.
78, deals to a great extent with the duties of a trial judge, it
also points out certain duties of a trial lawyer as an attorney
and also as an officer of the court. From all angles the de-
cision should be carefully studied before one tries his first
case. As concerns the trial lawyer attention is called to what
the Court said at the bottom of page 149:
*.. Out of the almost insuperable difficulty of so charg-
ing the law as to comprehend all the possible points of
view which a party may be entitled to have presented
arise the duty and right of counsel to aid the Court in
the function of instructing the jury by submitting appro-
priate requests to charge....
... The practice of counsel in tendering unduly numerous,
lengthy, and involved requests is not to be commended.
It is not only proper for the trial Judge to decline to give
such requests in the form or language submitted, but it is
his duty to do so in the interest of clearness if the meri-
torious points of the requests are fairly and adequately
covered in his general charge.
And very important to the trial lawyer is the following on
page 151:
If the trial Judge is a responsible minister of justice,
so likewise is the attorney at law. He is an officer of the
Court charged with the duty of using all legitimate means
skillfully and fairly to present his client's cause. Just
as "the law clothes the Judges with the presumption of
poise and dignity, and fairness in both mind and manner"
(State v. Driggers, 84 S. C. 531, 66 S. E. 1042, 137 Am.
St. Rep. 855, 19 Ann. Cas. 1166), so likewise it clothes
the attorney with the presumption of good faith and of
fair and candid dealing with Court and jury. It should
always be assumed, therefore, that the painstaking labor
of counsel in the preparation of elaborate requests to
charge has been actuated by a sincere desire to aid and
not to embarrass the Court in declaring the law. The
8
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duty of counsel in that regard is to be considered and
interpreted in the light of numerous decisions of this
Court to the effect that failure to request the Court to
charge a particular proposition of law, or to charge the
law more fully upon a given point, or to present the law
as to a particular contention or theory fairly founded
upon the evidence, will be deemed a waiver of the right to
such instruction. [Cases Cited] If therefore error is
committed in failing to give a sound and appropriate in-
struction prayed for, it cannot be justified or absolved
upon the ground that the requests were unduly lengthy or
complex. If necessary for that purpose, a recess should
be taken, or the jury excused for a sufficient period of
time to afford the Court opportunity to examine and con-
sider the requests properly tendered.
A trial lawyer should never place himself in the unenviable
position of having to be soundly criticized by the Supreme
Court, or by any court for that matter, and have himself go
down for misbehavior in a perpetual record as happened in
State . Bighara (1925), 133 S. C. 491, 131 S. E. 603. At page
502 of that decision one finds the following:
It is true that his Honor excluded the evidence; yet he
allowed the State's attorney to persist in asking questions
which were in conflict with his Honor's ruling.
The action of the assistant State counsel was highly
reprehensible, and deserves the highest condemnation
and censure; his Honor should have stopped and required
him to adhere to the rulings of the Court. The attorney
disregarded and practically defied the rulings of the
Court, and should have been stopped and brought up and
made to respect the rulings of the Court. He, by his
disregard of his Honor's ruling, nullified the effect of the
Court's ruling by his persistent and repeated violations
of the same. He should have been brought up in short
order and made to conform to the Court's ruling.
The defendant was on trial for killing one person, yet
every detail of the five homicides was presented to the
jury, even to the skull of his mother. The defendant was
not being tried for killing her, but was being tried for
killing L. Smiley Bigham.
[Vol. Ii
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... The cross-examination was not competent; it was
unfair; in violation of the rulings of his Honor; and
most deeply and highly prejudicial to the defendant.
The defendant was practically on trial for killing five
members of his family, although really on trial as charged
for killing his brother, Smiley Bigham. He was under
the Constitution entitled to a fair and impartial trial; the
action of the assistant state counsel in the cross-exami-
nation of the defendant was insinuating, suggestive of
other murders, unfair, in violation of the rulings of his
Honor and in violation of the decisions of this Court.
State v. McGill (1939), 191 S. C. 1, 3 S. E. 2d 257, leaves
no doubt as to the several duties of a solicitor as an officer of
the court. At page 9 Justice Stabler declared:
... "The rule that it is always the duty of the prosecuting
attorney to treat the defendant in a fair and impartial
manner applies to his argument to the jury." State v.
McDonald, 184 S. C., 290, 192 S. E., 365, 370. He "is a
quasi-judicial officer, and this Court has repeatedly held
that a solicitor must not, because of the high position he
holds, say things, or do things, which would have any
effect to prevent a citizen, however humble, from obtain-
ing the fair and impartial trial he is entitled to under
the law." State v. Parris, 163 S. C., 295, 161 S. E., 496,
498. But this does not mean that he should not prosecute
vigorously so long as he is just to the defendant, his
duty to the State being coexistent with his duty to see
that the accused is given a fair trial.
In the foregoing case it was held that the solicitor's argu-
ment was "indiscreet" but that it was harmless considering
the entire testimony for the State. However, it is well to
note the four (4) conditions precedent which are necessary
for seeking a new trial because of unfair or improper argu-
ment. These are:
... (1) That timely objection was interposed to the
argument;
(2) the substance, at least, of the objectionable
language;
(3) the failure of the court to sufficiently warn
the jury not to consider the improper argument;
and (4) that the result was to materially preju-
10
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dice the right of the losing litigant to obtain a
fair and impartial trial."
As pointed out in the foregoing case, like in Anderson v.
Ballenger (1932), 166 S. C. 44, 164 S. E. 313, a refusal of a
new trial for misconduct of counsel is within the trial judge's
discretion. It is only when he abuses it that legal error will
ensue. In the Anderson decision plaintiff's counsel while cross-
examining defendant's witness in an accident case used an
insurance report in plain view of the jury, and in this State
insurance companies who "hold the bag" for private persons
must be kept out of the picture. It is of course different
where a statute requires such insurance, as with certain motor
vehicles of public service companies. In such cases both the
owner and the insurer can be sued jointly. Benn v. Camel City
Coach Co. (1930), 162 S. C. 44, 160 S. E. 135. Sections 58-
1481 and 58-1512.
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